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BY RAKESH SARIN AND PETER WAKKER1
THIS NOTE GENERALIZES THE RESULTS by Sarin and Wakker (1992a) and Machina and Schmeidler (1992) to derive a "cumulative capacity functional." Thus we obtain a general decision theoretic foundation for the representation of beliefs by capacities ("nonadditive probabilities"). Choquet expected utility and probabilistically sophisticated preferences are two special cases of our cumulative capacity model.
Notations and definitions are as in Sarin and Wakker (1992a) , and are summarized as follows. e is the set of consequences; S is the state space; v is the sigma-algebra on S of events; W'ua is the sub-sigma-algebra of unambiguous events; $F is the set of acts (maps from S to e, assumed finite-valued and W(measurable in this note); Fua is the set of W,a-measurable acts; fAh coincides with act f on A, with act h on Ac; a denotes both a consequence and the related constant act; a is the preference relation over acts, that also denotes the induced ordering of consequences and an induced ordering of events defined by A a B if aAf3 , a B f for outcomes a >-,. The latter "more-likely-than" relation will be used in P4 below. For further discussions and details the reader is referred to Sarin and Wakker (1992a). Next we list the conditions used in the main result. The statement of P4 below (as well as P4D discussed after) has been simplified as compared to P4 in Sarin and Wakker (1992a); the simplification is possible because this note only considers acts with a finite range. P4 considers cumulative events (receiving consequence a or anything better), and the more-likely-than relation has been defined accordingly. An alternative formulation can be given in terms of decumulative events (receiving consequence a or anything worse). Then one defines A a *B if I3Aa i f3Ba for some a >-3, and requires f a' g whenever {s: g(s) i, a} a* {s: f(s) i a) for all consequences a. This "dual" condition is equivalent to P4, as one sees by complement taking. Nehring (1993) considers a condition P4D, requiring (together with his definition L1)f a g whenever {s: g(s) i x a) , {s: f(s) i( a) for all consequences a. That is, the condition considers decumulative events where, however, the more likely than relation a, has been derived from cumulative events. Hence condition P4D is not truly dual to P4; it imposes the restriction v(A) + v(AC) = 1 and excludes Ellsberg-type preferences.
Postulates P1-P6 are used to derive a capacity measure v over events in a general decision model that will now be described. 
